ceived health insurance from their former employers, this fraction increased to almost half for those retiring in the 1980s (Madrian 1994) .
This paper looks at the effect on retirement of a third source of health insurance for early retirees, namely continuation coverage benefits. During the late 1970s and early 1980s many states mandated that employers allow employees who leave their jobs to continue purchasing their group health insurance for a specified number of months. These continuation benefits were extended to all workers in 1986 as part of the federal Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) legislation. Although this coverage is available to all workers regardless of age, it should be particularly attractive to older workers who face a relatively high price for health insurance in the private market and who are more likely to be subject to the preexisting-conditions exclusions that are characteristic of such policies.
To identify the effect of continuation benefits on retirement, we exploit the fact that these benefits were mandated at different times by different states (and finally the federal government) and that the generosity of the mandates varied across states as well. Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), we find a strong correlation between the availability of continuation benefits and the likelihood that individuals are retired. Our key finding is that, among men aged 55-64, one year of continuation benefits increases the probability of being retired by 1 percentage point; this is 5.4% of the baseline probability of being retired for this group. Furthermore, we find that, although the estimated percentage-point effects are strongest near the age of Medicare eligibility, as a fraction of baseline retirement probabilities they actually decline with age. Although this latter result is somewhat counterintuitive, it is consistent with other work that examines the effect of continuation coverage on flows into retirement (Gruber and Madrian 1995) . We also find that continuation coverage mandates significantly increase the likelihood that early retirees are covered by employer-provided health insurance after retirement. This effect is much larger than the implied effect on retirement, suggesting that much of the increase in coverage is occumng among those individuals who would have retired even in the absence of such benefits.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 4.1 provides some motivation for why health insurance should matter in the early retirement decision. Section 4.2 outlines the state and federal continuation coverage laws, which we use to identify the effect of health insurance on retirement. This is followed in section 4.3 by a model that formalizes the effect of health insurance on retirement. The data and regression framework are presented in section 4.4, and the results follow in section 4.5 along with a comparison with our findings from dynamic models of retirement behavior. Section 4.6 considers the impact of continuation coverage mandates on insurance coverage. The paper concludes in section 4.7 with a discussion of the methodological and policy implications of our results.
Health Insurance and Retirement: Should It Matter?
The high and variable level of medical expenditures for persons aged 55-64, without the guarantee of public coverage through Medicare for those over age 65, means that the availability of health insurance coverage could be a key factor in determining the timing of retirement. Until recently, however, there has been little study of the effect of retiree health insurance coverage on retirement patterns. Two recent papers have attempted to model the role of health insurance in the retirement decision. Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1994) incorporate the value of Medicare into an option value model of retirement and find no effect of Medicare eligibility on the retirement hazard. Their result is not surprising, however, as they estimate their model on a sample of workers from the same firm, all of whom have employer-provided postretirement health insurance that is much more generous than Medicare. Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) use information from the Retirement History Survey, a longitudinal survey from the 1970s, to ascertain whether individuals have employer-provided retiree health insurance, and data from the 1977 National Medical Care Expenditure Survey, to impute the value of that insurance based on individual characteristics. They also find very small effects of retiree health insurance on retirement decisions.
The results of these two studies are at odds with both intuition and with what individuals report about the importance of health insurance in the retirement decision. In a recent Gallup poll, 63% of working Americans reported that they "would delay retirement until becoming eligible for Medicare [age 651 if their employers were not going to provide health coverage" despite the fact that 50% "said they would prefer to retire early-by age 62" (Employee Benefits Research Institute 1990) . The apparent contradiction between the importance of health insurance as stated by individuals and that estimated by these two previous studies provides a further motivation for our research.
Health Status of Older Individuals
That individuals should cite health insurance as an important consideration in the retirement decision is not surprising, as older persons are fairly likely to need expensive medical care. Tables 4.1-4.4 compare the health status of individuals by age along a number of dimensions. The simplest measure, selfreported health status, is shown in table 4.1. The fraction of individuals who report being in fair or poor health increases markedly from ages 45-54 (19.7%) to ages 55-64 (31.3%) . While recent research has suggested that selfreported health status may be a poor indicator of the actual severity of an individual's clinical conditions (Bazzoli 1985) , it may be the most accurate measure of an individual's valuation of health insurance coverage. Thus, these figures suggest that insurance valuation will rise dramatically with age.
Furthermore, as table 4.2 shows, health status as measured by doctor- diagnosed health problems deteriorates with age as well. The incidence of many of the health problems listed (stroke, cancer, heart attack, arteriosclerosis, emphysema, and heart disease) more than doubles between 45-54 and ages 55-64. Furthermore, almost three-quarters of those aged 55-64 have been diagnosed with at least one of the eleven conditions listed. Not surprisingly, relative to those aged 45-54, individuals 55-64 are more likely to be admitted to the hospital over the course of a year and spend more time there once admitted (table 4.3).
The most direct evidence that health insurance should be valued relatively highly by older workers, however, is that the actual medical expenses incurred by those aged 55-64 are much higher than those of younger individuals (table 4.4). In every category not only do expenditures rise with age, but the variance 
Health Insurance Coverage and Costs
Given the costs of health care for older workers, it should not be surprising that older individuals are no more likely to be uninsured than their younger counterparts, as is shown in table 4.5. The sources of health insurance coverage, however, differ with age. Even though employment-based health insurance is the predominant source of coverage regardless of age, older individuals are less likely than younger persons to have employment-based health insurance and much more likely to be covered by a nongroup (individual) or other group policy. This suggests that individuals who retire early but who do not have access to employer-provided health insurance turn to the individual market for insurance.
The bottom two panels of table 4.5 break down the sources of health insurance coverage by employment status. There are three major differences between the sources of health insurance coverage for those who are and are not employed. First, one-fifth of nonworking older persons are insured through Medicare or Medicaid, while only 1 % of the older employed receive coverage from one of these two sources. Second, older nonworking individuals are 40% less likely to be uninsured than their younger counterparts. Third, relative to the young, the older nonworking are six times more likely to be covered by employer-provided health insurance in their own name.
These last two differences are explained in large part by the availability of employer-provided postretirement health insurance. Forty-five percent of individuals work in firms that provide retiree health insurance benefits.* The older nonworking, who are more likely to be retired than the young nonworking, are therefore more likely to be covered by employer-provided retiree health insurance.
There are, nevertheless, a substantial number of older individuals who are not covered by either employer or government-provided health insurance. It is these individuals who find themselves in the market for individual health insurance and who we would therefore expect to benefit from the availability of 1. Exoenditures as a fraction of income are calculated using income data from the March 1990 -
CPS .
2. See Madrian (1994) for background on the structure and availability of postretirement health insurance. Employers have significant cost advantages in providing health insurance. By pooling the risks of many individuals, they are able to lower administrative expenses and reduce adverse selection. These two factors alone are estimated to reduce the cost of providing insurance in large (ten thousand or more employees) firms relative to small (one to four employees) firms by 40% (Congressional Research Service 1988) . For older individuals the cost differential between employer-provided and individual health insurance is exacerbated because policies in the individual market are typically age-rated, while within the firm younger workers subsidize the health insurance costs of their older coworkers. The Congressional Research Service (1988) reports that the cost to employers of providing insurance coverage for 55-64-year-old males is three times that of providing coverage to males under 40; for females, the ratio is two to 0ne.3
In Massachusetts the average cost of family health insurance coverage per employee in 1989 was $3,882.4 When inflated by the medical care component of the consumer price index, this is equivalent to $5,047 in 1993 dollars. In contrast, a New England commercial insurance company is offering a family policy for a 58-year-old male with a one-year preexisting-conditions exclusion at a price of $8,640. This represents 26% of the average family income of retired individuals aged 55-64 in Massachusetts. Individual policies may also be medically underwritten so that sick individuals may face substantially higher prices or may not be able to purchase a policy at all.
The coverage available in the private market not only is expensive, but also is typically less generous than employer-provided health insurance. Table 4 .6 compares the health insurance benefits of individuals covered under group and nongroup policies in 1977. In every category, those covered under nongroup policies receive more limited benefits. Relative to those with nongroup coverage, those with group policies are more than twice as likely to receive major medical coverage or coverage for physician office visits and prescription drugs, and more than 50% more likely to receive ambulance, mental health, and outpatient diagnostic service coverage. Furthermore, nongroup policies generally feature both higher deductibles and higher copayments. Thus, relative to the individual market, group coverage offers individuals higher-quality insurance coverage at a significantly lower price.
Continuation Coverage Laws
For those individuals whose employers do not offer retiree health insurance, an alternative to purchasing health insurance in the individual market is provided by various state and federal continuation coverage laws. These laws mandate that employers sponsoring group health insurance plans offer terminating employees and their families the right to continue their health insurance coverage through the employer's plan for a specified period of time. The laws gener- The length of coverage is generally quite short, from three to six months, although nine states mandate coverage of nine months or more. Although most state laws stipulate that an employee must have been covered by an employer's insurance for three to six months before being eligible for continuation coverage, this requirement is not likely to be binding on older workers, most of whom have been with their current employer for many years.' The state laws also apply only to firms that actually purchase insurance through an insurance company; self-insured firms, under the 1974 Employee Retirement Income and Security Act (ERISA), are not subject to these (or any other) state mandates.* Although similar in spirit, the state and federal laws differ in a number of important ways. First, the length of coverage mandated under the federal law, eighteen months, equals or exceeds that mandated by all but one state (as of January 1987, Connecticut law provides for up to twenty months of c~verage).~ Second, there is no minimal length of time for which an employee must be covered under an employer's plan before being eligible for continuation benefits. Third, the federal law applies to self-insured firms, who are exempt from the state laws, as well as to those who purchase their coverage from insurers. The federal law, however, does not apply to small firms employing less than twenty workers. Finally, employees of religious organizations and the federal government were exempt from COBRA, although federal employees have subsequently been included (beginning in 1990) . When the specific details of the 5. Because retirement is a voluntary separation, we treat those states whose laws apply only to involuntarily terminated employees as states without laws.
6. Details on state laws are from Hewitt (1985) and Thompson Publishing Group (1992) and have been cross-checked against the actual state statutes. Table 4 .7 lists only those states with laws that apply to employees who terminate their employment voluntarily.
7. Almost 95% of retirees have job tenure of at least ten years by the time they retire (Madrian 1994). 8. In a related paper we incorporate a correction factor that accounts for the exclusion of some firms from the effects of these laws (Gruber and Madrian 1995) . This has little effect on the significance of the estimates of the effect of continuation coverage on retirement, although the magnitude increases two-to threefold.
9. Eighteen months is the maximum length of coverage available following the voluntary or involuntary termination of employment. COBRA also provides up to thirty-six months of coverage for family members who would otherwise lose their insurance coverage through events such as an employee's death, divorce from the employee, or the employee's eligibility for Medicare. state and federal statutes are at odds, firm provision of continuation benefits is governed by the law that provides for more generous coverage.
The effective dates of the state laws are listed in table 4.7. The federal coverage mandated under COBRA was phased in. Beginning in July 1986, firms had to offer continuation benefits at the start of their next plan year. For workers provided health insurance under union contracts, such benefits did not have to be offered until the next contract negotiation after January 1987.
Both the state and federal laws stipulate that the employee must pay the full cost of the coverage. At the federal level, this is defined specifically as 102% of the average employer cost of providing coverage. The coverage must be identical to that provided to similarly situated active employees, including the option to continue enrollment in supplemental insurance plans (such as for vision or dental care) if these are available. Although 102% of the employer's cost is typically much more than individuals pay as active employees, it is, as already noted, substantially less than the cost of buying equivalent coverage in the private market, especially for older workers.
Because continuation coverage is a relatively new phenomenon (at least at the national level), information on the extent of continuation coverage is somewhat scarce. Zedlewski (1993) estimates that, in 1988,5.2% of retired workers aged 55-64 were covered by COBRA health insurance. This figure must be interpreted relative to the number of individuals who could be expected to take up such coverage. The 52% of individuals aged 55-64 with retiree health insurance are not likely to be covered, and the 21% of individuals who were not insured through their former employer are not eligible. Similarly, those who have been retired for more than eighteen months have exceeded their potential eligibility. Tabulations from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey indicate that one-third of retired individuals aged 55-64 have been retired for less than eighteen months. If we take the group who could potentially be affected by COBRA to be one-third of retired individuals between ages 55
and 64 who worked in firms that provided health insurance but did not provide retiree health insurance, we would expect at most 9% of early retirees to be covered. That 5.2% receive continuation benefits suggests that 58% of the retired population who would be at all likely to be covered by COBRA actually are. As knowledge about the availability of such coverage has become more widespread since 1988, this fraction may be higher today.
An alternative calculation is possible using figures reported in Flynn (1992) . She uses data from a large firm that administers COBRA claims to estimate that 23% of individuals who qualified for COBRA coverage because of retirement elected to receive benefits. If we expected only the 30% of individuals in firms that offer health insurance but do not offer retiree health insurance to even consider purchasing COBRA insurance, this take-up rate implies that 75% of those most likely to be covered by continuation benefits actually are. Both of these calculations, therefore, suggest that retirees without an altemative source of health insurance coverage are quite likely to elect continuation coverage.
For all COBRA beneficiaries, the average length of time on COBRA was seven months (Flynn 1992) . Individuals over age 61, however, maintained their coverage for a much longer period of time-about twelve months on average. This finding is not surprising for two reasons. First, younger individuals are more likely to find alternative coverage through a new job or a spouse's employment. Second, COBRA coverage provides a larger subsidy for older workers; with a lower relative price, they should therefore demand more coverage. Table 4 .8 compares the distribution of health insurance coverage in 1984, two years before COBRA was first implemented, and in 1989, two years after it had been phased in. Note that employment-based health insurance coverage is more prevalent after COBRA, and that this effect is confined to those who are not employed, exactly the group whom we would expect to be insured under COBRA. This finding is similar to evidence presented in Rogowski and Karoly (1 992), who examined the primary source of insurance coverage after retirement, based on the source of insurance coverage before retirement, before and after COBRA. They find that in the pre-COBRA period, 72% of individuals who retired from jobs with employment-based health insurance continued to be covered by that insurance upon retirement. After COBRA, this figure rises to 78.5%.1° Taken together, the evidence on take-up rates and the increase in the extent of employer-provided health insurance coverage among early re-10. We present a stronger test of the effect of continuation coverage mandates on insurance coverage in section 4.6. tirees after COBRA suggests that older workers who retire early and who do not have an alternative source of coverage actually avail themselves of the continuation benefits to which they are entitled.
Modeling the Effect of Health Insurance on Retirement
We present a simple graphical exposition of the effect of health insurance benefits on the retirement decision, along the lines of Burtless (1986) and Burtless and Moffitt (1984) . We consider both retiree health insurance in general and continuation benefits more specifically. Figure 4 .1 shows the budget constraint facing an older worker between the ages of 55 and 65. The horizontal axis represents the age of retirement. The vertical axis measures the certainty equivalent (CE) of consumption from age 55 onward. This differs from the earlier literature, which has typically considered the relationship between the age at retirement and the actual level of future consumption rather than the CE of future consumption. This departure is necessitated by our focus on the effect of insurance coverage.
We assume that workers receive health insurance on their current job but that they may or may not have retiree health insurance coverage. Firms that provide postretirement health insurance do so on the same basis for both workers and retirees, and these benefits cease upon eligibility for Medicare." We also assume that once workers leave their current job, they will remain retired for the rest of their life. To simplify the analysis, we ignore the effects of both 11. In reality, most retiree health insurance plans do "top off" Medicare to some extent. This does not alter the main conclusions of this section. Social Security and pensions; they could, however, be easily incorporated into the analysis.
In the model, as in the real world, workers who retire without health insurance coverage have two options: they may purchase an individual policy, or go uninsured. In either case their out-of-pocket medical expenditures will be significantly higher than if they receive retiree coverage or have the option of continuing their group coverage. For a worker with retiree health insurance, the slope of the budget constraint will be the after-tax wage, which is depicted by line AB in figure 4.1. Since medical expenditures are insured, there is no uncertainty about future consumption.
For the worker without retiree coverage, the relative position and slope of the budget constraint depend on two factors. First, because individuals are risk averse, those without retiree health insurance will have a lower level of CE consumption; this places the no-health-insurance budget constraint below that of an insured worker.'* Second, because both the mean and the variance of medical expenditures rise with age, a year of health insurance coverage is worth more at older ages. The cumulative reduction in CE consumption will be greater at younger retirement ages, but the incremental effect will be smaller. This latter effect gives curvature to the no-health-insurance budget constraint, line CD in figure 4.1. At age 65 there is a jump in the no-healthinsurance budget constraint as Medicare equalizes the opportunities of all individuals.
If leisure is a normal good, retiree health insurance will lead to earlier retirement, at age R , < R,, because such coverage makes individuals wealthier. As 12. Risk aversion in this model operates in a similar fashion to higher expected medical costs.
individuals are more risk averse, the wealth effect will increase as both the level of the no-health-insurance budget constraint falls and its slope becomes steeper. Now consider the effect of a continuation coverage mandate that provides one year of subsidized insurance coverage relative to having no health insurance. For the risk-neutral worker, this is simply equivalent to an increment in wealth equal to expected medical costs for a year minus the cost of the group policy.13 This increment rises in value as the worker ages, since expected medical expenditures increase with age. Thus, the budget constraint with a continuation coverage option, line EE lies above the no-health-insurance constraint but below the retiree-coverage constraint. At younger ages, it is very close to the no-health-insurance constraint; at age 64, it differs from the retireecoverage constraint by the cost of the group coverage. As workers become more risk averse and the no-health-insurance constraint becomes steeper, the distance between the no-health-insurance and the continuation coverage constraints will increase, and this increase will be greater at older ages. In this case the value of one year of coverage will equal expected medical costs minus the cost of the group policy plus the increase in CE consumption implied by eliminating uncertainty in that year.
The value of both retiree health insurance and continuation benefits will rise with the cost of being uninsured or the cost of buying individual insurance in the private market. The important difference between these two sources of coverage, however, is their age patterns: while retiree insurance coverage is of highest value to very early retirees, continuation benefits are more valuable at older ages. Because of this, we might expect continuation benefits to be used primarily by older workers seeking a "bridge to Medicare," which allows them to retire a certain number of months before age 65 without losing group coverage. If this is the case, we would expect the effect of continuation coverage on retirement to be greatest at older ages.
There are, however, a number of complications that cloud this basic intuition. The first is the empirical violation of one of our assumptions, namely, that retirement is permanent. Diamond and Hausman (1984) report substantial reentry rates for early retirees; among 55-64-year-olds, the one-year reentry rate is approximately 15%. Sueyoshi (1989) finds that one-third of the elderly "partially retire," moving from permanent employment to less than full-time work. To the extent that continuation coverage mandates facilitate movement across jobs, rather than permanent retirement, they may have larger effects at younger ages than was depicted above.I4
In this analysis we have assumed that retiree health insurance offers pure 13. Once again, this amount is presumably positive even for a risk-neutral worker due to cross-14. One important consideration, of course, is whether this reentry is to jobs that offer health subsidization of the group policy by younger coworkers.
insurance; unfortunately, there is little evidence on this question.
rents to workers in the firms that offer this type of coverage. In labor market equilibrium, presumably at least a portion of these rents will be reflected in lower wages for workers with retiree coverage. The extent to which these compensating differentials offset the benefits of retiree health insurance at each age will be a function of the employer's ability to set relative age-specific wages freely,I5 the mobility of workers across firms at different ages, and the excess of the cost of continuation benefits over the group premium paid by the early retiree.I6 The existence of compensating differentials may affect both the location and the shape of the budget constraint facing the potential retiree; the net effect on retirement age will be a function of the nature of the compensating differential." Finally, we have ignored the possibility that workers may be liquidity constrained in making their retirement decisions. The fact that most retirees have few liquid assets (Diamond and Hausman 1984) implies that such liquidity constraints may be empirically important in determining retirement dates. This explanation is suggested in both Diamond and Hausman (1984) and Burtless and Moffitt (1984) in their discussion of why Social Security benefits do not seem to affect retirement until they actually become available at age 62. Samwick (1993) finds that much of the estimated increase in retirement probabilities attributed to Social Security occurs among those with pensions, suggesting that all workers would like to take advantage of these benefits early, but that only those with pensions can afford to do so. The presence of liquidity constraints could increase the effect of continuation benefits at younger ages, as the wealth increment that these benefits represent could be loosening these constraints.
Data and Regression Framework

Data
The data for this study must meet two key criteria. First, in order to exploit the variation in state and federal continuation coverage legislation, they must extend over a number of years before and after 1986. Second, there must be a 15. See Rosen (1986) for a discussion of the theory of compensating differentials. Gruber (1994a) provides some evidence that shifting the costs of employer-provided benefits to distinct demographic groups in the workplace is feasible.
16. Huth (1991) reports that the health insurance claims of COBRA recipients exceed those of active employees by 50%. This difference in cost is attributed to adverse selection; it is the sickest individuals who will find continuation coverage most attractive, and they will therefore be the ones most likely to take it up. Similar evidence is provided in Long and Marquis (1992) .
17. For example, if the entire cost of the benefits is shifted to older workers, this will lower the slope of the budget constraint with continuation benefits ( fig. 4.1) relative to the budget constraint without benefits (because wages for those with benefits fall), which will have both income and substitution effects on the retirement decision. large sample size so that the effects of state-law changes on older workers can be identified. The data that best meet these two criteria are the Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) sample of the CPS. The CPS is a nationally representative survey that interviews over fifty thousand households each month. The MORG file contains information on demographic characteristics and labor force attachment during the survey week for one-quarter of each month's sample for each month of the year. This is the largest available annual data set on individual labor force behavior in the United States.
Recent studies of retirement behavior have focused on dynamic modeling of the transition into retirement. In this paper we instead use a static model of whether or not an individual is currently retired, since the only labor force information we have in the MORG is for the week of the interview. Evidence on the stock of retired persons can still be useful for considering the effect of continuation coverage mandates on retirement; if the laws are affecting flows, they should affect stocks as well.L8 Furthermore, dynamic modeling strategies for retirement decisions using survey data sets often suffer from an important econometric difficulty, known as dynamic sample selection bias (Diamond and Hausman 1984) . In the case of continuation coverage laws, this bias arises from the fact that the set of individuals observed actually working after the law has been in place for a number of years would be less likely to retire in response to the law than would the entire population, because those most likely to respond will have already retired. When the sample is selected on the basis of those who are still working, the results will therefore be biased against finding an effect of the law.19 In a multivariate setting, the bias cannot be signed a priori, and with time-varying covariates in the model, such as months of continuation coverage, it is impossible to correct for this "left-censoring."20 Our static regressions, which include all 55-64-year-old males regardless of initial work status, do not suffer from this bias.
On the other hand, the major disadvantage of our static framework is that we cannot control for the characteristics of the job from which the individual has retired. This will be important if, for example, there is a systematic correlation between the passage of these mandates and the nature of the jobs in the states where they are passed. In the regression analysis we attempt to reduce any bias that results from this potential correlation by controlling for the time-18. This is not strictly true if the mandates affect the number of persons who decide to work at all; in this case, both the numerator and denominator of the labor force participation rate would be increasing, and the effect on the stock would be ambiguous. This is not likely to be a problem for the sample of older males on which we focus.
19. An alternative way to see this point is to imagine a law that applied to a cohort rather than to an age group. The individuals who are most likely to respond to this law will do so in the first year. In the next year, by selecting on the set of individuals who have not yet retired, we will bias the results against finding an effect of the law. When the law applies to an age group, rather than a cohort, this effect is attenuated by the fact that new members arrive into the age group. 20. It is possible, however, to test for the magnitude of the bias; see Gruber and Madrian (1995) .
invariant characteristics of the states that pass these mandates. In section 4.5 we will contrast our findings from this static regression with those from dynamic models that allow us to better control for the types of jobs held by individuals.
Regression Framework
We focus on two definitions of retirement: whether or not an individual reports being retired, and whether or not an individual is out of the labor force. Both are based on a CPS question that asks about the major activity in which an individual was engaged during the week before the survey. The latter definition is useful because retirement may be a subjective term that takes on different meanings for different individuals. These retirement definitions are clearly problematic along at least two dimensions. First, we are unable to contrast the effect of these regulations on both "full" and "partial" retirement, as is done in Burtless and Moffitt (1984) or Sueyoshi (1989) . Second, we are unable to account for reentry into the labor market, as discussed in Diamond and Hausman (1984) . Nevertheless, these measures should provide reasonable estimates of the effect of continuation coverage mandates on the propensity of older workers to remain employed. Our sample consists of men between the ages of 55 and 64. Overall, 20% of the sample report being retired, and 35% are out of the labor force. The average level of education is twelve years, and 9.5% of the sample is nonwhite. We estimate the following probit model of retirement: is a set of year and month dummies, and Lawjr is the number of months of continuation coverage available in state j at time t? The state fixed effects control for any time-invariant characteristics of a state that may be correlated with the state's propensity to pass continuation coverage legislation. We include a set of year dummies to control for national trends in retirement behavior that may be correlated with the passage of these laws, and month dummies to control for seasonal patterns in retirement behavior. Thus, the effect of the laws is identified in this model by changes in retirement behavior in states that passed the laws (or that were affected by the federal law), relative to those that did not, during the period after the laws were passed. Further identifying variation comes from differences across states in the number of months of 21. We exclude individuals from two states from our sample: Hawaii, which has mandated health insurance for all employees, and West Virginia, for which we were unable to definitively date the effective date of their continuation coverage mandate. eligibility that these laws allow. Since we have monthly data, we phase in the federal law in twelve equal increments between July 1986 and June 1987.
Results
The basic regression results are reported in table 4.9. The first column reports the probit coefficients from the self-reported retirement equation, while the second column gives the marginal probabilities implied by these coeffi- cientsZ2 The same is done in the third and fourth columns, using "not in the labor force" as the definition of retirement. More education is associated with a slightly lower probability of being retired and a much lower probability of being out of the labor force. Being nonwhite is associated with a lower probability of retirement but a significantly higher probability of being out of the labor force. Individuals who are married are less likely to be either retired or out of the labor force. The age pattern of retirement propensities is familiar from the previous literature; there is a large jump in the probability of being retired at age 62, and individuals aged 64 are 25% more likely to be retired than individuals aged 55. This pattern is even more pronounced for being out of the labor force, as the probability at age 64 is 40% greater than the probability at age 55.
The availability of continuation coverage has a sizable and significant effect on the probability of being retired. One year of coverage raises the probability that an individual is retired by 1.1 percentage points, which is 5.4% of the baseline probability of being retired in this sample. For the not-in-the-laborforce regressions, the estimated effect of a year of continuation coverage is of approximately the same magnitude as in the retired equation (although the coefficient is only significant at the 10% level), and suggests an increase in the baseline probability of being out of the labor force of 2.8%.
The model described in section 4.3 suggests the possibility that the effect of continuation coverage mandates on retirement could vary with age; intuitively, it seemed that this effect should be strongest at older ages. In table 4.10, therefore, we free up the effect of months of continuation coverage by age. The second and fifth columns present the marginal probability derivatives of the probits. The third and sixth columns express these percentage-point increases in retirement propensities as a fraction of the baseline retirement rate at each age. This allows for a more natural interpretation of the percentage effects of continuation benefits on retirement at each age.
In both equations the coefficients rise with age and are statistically significant at ages 62 and above. The pattern of effects as a fraction of baseline retirement probabilities, however, is not uniformly supportive of the hypothesis suggested in section 4.3. For the retirement equation, there is actually a declining pattern of effects by age; for the not-in-the-labor-force equation, the effects are slightly increasing with age.
There are several possible explanations for this counterintuitive finding that the effects are not proportionately greatest at the ages near Medicare eligibility.
22. For dummy variables, the marginal probabilities are calculated by predicting the probability of retirement with the dummy equal to one for the entire sample, predicting the probability with the dummy set equal to zero for the entire sample, and taking the average of the difference in these predictions across all individuals. For continuous variables, the marginal probability is calculated by predicting the probability at the current level of the variable, predicting the probability by adding one to the variable, and once again taking the average of the difference in these predictions across individuals. The marginal probability on months of coverage is the probability increase associated with going from zero to twelve months of coverage. The first is the set of theoretical issues we raised in section 4.3, such as the possibility that individuals may face liquidity constraints that are loosened by this temporary health insurance. The second reason is statistical: we may not have enough power to these probits to distinguish true larger effects at older ages from the effects at younger ages. Given the precision of our estimates, this seems an unlikely explanation for the unexpected age pattern of our results. Alternatively, it may be that our result is spurious. One potential problem with our identification strategy is that the passage of these laws could be correlated with some other change in retirement behavior in these states. Alternatively, it could be that the laws themselves are endogenous responses to changes in retirement propensities among the population; that is, if more individuals are retiring, states may respond by mandating benefits that cover individuals after their retirement.
One form of potential endogeneity could be that the propensity of legisla-tures to mandate continuation coverage is correlated with long-term withinstate trends in retirement behavior. In this case, even with state fixed effects included in the regression, there will be a spurious correlation between changes in retirement behavior within a state and the passage of a continuation coverage mandate. One possible control for such spurious causation is to include in the regression not only state effects but state-specific trend terms; that is, we interact each state effect with a trend for the ten-year period.23 The results from this specification check are presented in table 4.11. For the not-inthe-labor-force regression, the age-specific coefficients are virtually unchanged from those in table 4.10; in the retirement equation, the coefficients are slightly larger, but once again the effects are very similar.
A further potential problem with these findings is that it may not be appropriate to compare the effects of the state and federal mandates. As we noted earlier, these mandates differ along a number of dimensions, the most important being that the state mandates do not apply to self-insured firms, while the federal mandate does not apply to small firms. In results not reported, we have rerun these regressions for the period prior to July 1986 in order to restrict our analysis to the effects of the state laws. The results are somewhat stronger than those in tables 4.10 and 4.11, although the age patterns are similar.
In related work (Gruber and Madrian 1995) , we consider the effect of continuation benefits on transitions into retirement using two different data setsthe March files of the CPS, and the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). These data sources allow us to estimate dynamic retirement models and to control for some characteristics of the jobs from which individuals retire. The sample sizes are much smaller than we have with the MORG data, however, and we are confronted with the issue of dynamic sample selection, discussed above. Nevertheless, this study confirms the two key findings of the research reported above. First, there is a sizable and significant effect of continuation coverage on retirement behavior. Using one-year retirement transitions in the March CPS, we find that one year of continuation coverage raises retirement propensities by 1.4 percentage points. This is quite similar to the 1.1 percentage-point effect estimated in this paper using the MORG data. Furthermore, the implied effect on the hazard rate in both the March CPS and SIPP data is identical.
Second, despite the presumption that these laws should act as a "bridge to Medicare," the estimated effects in these dynamic models do not rise with age either. Figure 4 .2 graphs the change in the propensity to be retired from having a year of continuation coverage estimated from the MORG regressions (column three of table 4.10) along with the percentage increase in retirement probabilities estimated using transition data from the March CPS (Gruber and 23. The trend is monthly, taking on values of 1 to 132. This type of "random growth" or "fixed trend" estimator is suggested by Heckman and Hotz (1988) and is used by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1992) and Gruber (1994b). Madrian 1995).24 To facilitate comparability, the two series are each normalized to take on a value of one at age 55. While the pattern of effects differs somewhat at the early ages, both series show a similar decline after age 59, and the effect at age 64 is approximately one-third as large as that at age 55. Thus, our two main findings from the static framework employed in this paper are borne out in the dynamic model that we employ elsewhere.
24. These latter coefficients come from the model that is most comparable to that used in this paper. See Gruber and Madrian (1995) for a number of extensions to this basic dynamic model. It is also interesting to consider what the magnitude of these findings imply about individual valuation of continuation benefits by comparing them to the estimated increase in retirement propensities following an increase in postretirement income. The results from a static probit model of retirement in Samwick (1993) suggest that a $5,000 increment to Social Security wealth increases the retirement hazard by approximately 8%. In a stochastic dynamic programming model employed by Wise (1990a, 1990b) and Lumsdaine, Wise (1992, 1994) , they find that a $5,000 increase in the value of pension wealth leads to an increase in the retirement hazard of between 10 and 13% for individuals between the ages of 55 and 64. 25 The basic specification of Gruber and Madrian (1995) finds that one year of continuation coverage raises the retirement hazard by 32%. This implies that a year of continuation benefits is valued at between $12,300 and $15,000 in terms of postretirement wealth. Based on the cost information reported in section 4.2, a COBRA policy would save an older worker approximately $4,500 per year on the price of family coverage. Taken at face value, these results suggest that workers value the insurance received from continuation coverage policies at a somewhat higher level than its associated cost savings. This may reflect the fact that the individual policy we priced, as with most individual policies, excluded preexisting conditions for some period. Alternatively, it may be that a number of early retirees must pay substantially more for individual policies or are unable to obtain such policies at all.
Insurance Coverage
In this section we consider the effects of continuation coverage mandates on the insurance coverage of early retirees. If continuation coverage mandates are having an effect on the retirement decisions of older workers, then, by definition, they should be affecting their insurance coverage as well. Thus, evidence that such mandates increase insurance coverage among early retirees provides a necessary (but not sufficient) specification check of our result that these mandates affect retirement behavior. Furthermore, it is interesting to contrast the direct effects of these mandates on insurance coverage with their indirect effects on retirement behavior. To what extent do continuation coverage mandates affect the "inframarginal" individual, who would have retired in their absence, relative to the "marginal" individual whose retirement decision is made in response to their presence?
In order to investigate the effect of continuation coverage mandates on insurance coverage, we use data from the SIpP.26 The SIPP is a nationally representative survey of households designed to collect information on the economic and demographic characteristics of individuals and their families. We use data from the 1984,1985,1986, and 1987 panels of the SIPP. Sample members are interviewed every four months for roughly two and a half years and asked to provide information about their labor market activity, income, and participation in welfare and transfer programs over the previous four months. The first interviews of the 1984 panel were conducted in October 1983, while the initial interviews for subsequent panels commenced in February of the corresponding calendar year. For previously cited reasons, we exclude individuals living in West Virginia and Hawaii. We also drop individuals from several other small states because, out of concern for confidentiality, the SIPP has grouped these states together, thereby making it impossible to assign the appropriate state laws to individuals in these states. 27 We restrict our sample to men aged 55-64 who retired during the sample period. The SIPP does not ask individuals directly whether they have retired. We therefore use a measure of retirement based on length of time out of the labor force. This has the advantage, relative to point-in-time self-reported measures, of capturing transitions to nonwork rather than partial (but perceived) retirement. It has the disadvantage, however, of not allowing us to disentangle retirement from other reasons for a temporary absence from the labor force. Following Rogowski and Karoly (1992), we define retirement as a departure 26. To keep the sample of individuals comparable to the MORG data used in this paper, one could in principle use the March CPS to look at insurance coverage over a similar time period. Unfortunately, a 1988 change in the questionnaire that altered the reported coverage rates of older individuals who were not working (precisely the group of interest) precludes performing a reliable analysis with this data set.
27. These states are Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. The CPS results are similar if we restrict our CPS sample in the same fashion. See Gruber and Madrian (1995) for more detail on our SIPP sample. from the labor force of five or more months.z8 Individuals who are not in the labor force for at least the first four months for which we observe them are excluded from the sample, and individuals who report being out of the labor force in the last five months of the panel are censored at the last month for which they are in the labor force. Table 4 .12 presents the results from a probit equation for whether or not an individual is covered by employer-provided health insurance after retirement. The key independent variable is the number of months of continuation coverage available at the time of retirement. The results suggest that an extra month of continuation coverage increases the probability of being insured after retirement by 0.5%. This implies that one year of coverage would increase the probability of being insured by 6%, while eighteen months would increase the probability of coverage by 9%, a result consistent with that found by Rogowski and Karoly (1992) . The results of table 4.12 corroborate the evidence on take-up rates presented in section 4.2. As mentioned, Zedlewski (1993) estimates that 5.2% of retired individuals between the ages of 55 and 64 are covered by COBRA. This fraction is very similar to our 6% estimated increase in coverage from one year of continuation coverage, which is the average length of time for which older individuals receive COBRA (Flynn 1992) .
28. Rogowski and Karoly (1992) actually impose a six-month rule for departure from the labor force. It turns out that almost all of the individuals who are out of the labor force for five months are actually out for six or more months. This definition of retirement helps alleviate the problem of measurement error in the reporting of individual labor force status; since individuals are interviewed every four months, they must report that they are out of the labor force in two consecutive interviews to be counted as retired. See Gruber and Madrian (1995) for further discussion.
Furthermore, we can reconcile this finding with our estimates of the effect of continuation coverage mandates on retirement. Our findings imply that one year of coverage raised the probability of being retired by about 1.1 percentage points, but that it raises the probability of being insured by 6 percentage points. This suggests that the primary effect of these mandates is "inframarginal." That is, they provide insurance coverage for individuals who would have retired in the absence of these mandates even though they would not have been covered by employer-provided health insurance. Thus, continuation coverage mandates may be policies with a sizable bang for the buck: they have a large and significant effect along their intended dimension, increased insurance coverage, with a relatively small effect along their unintended dimension, increased retirement.
Conclusion
A number of current policy proposals in the United States, such as increasing the age of Medicare eligibility to 67 or providing guaranteed health insurance coverage for all citizens, would affect the health insurance coverage of early retirees. Thus, it seems especially important at this time to understand the interaction between insurance coverage and the retirement decision. If retirement is very sensitive to insurance coverage, for example, it could have important public finance implications for policies that provide universal health insurance coverage; a spate of retirement may nontrivially lower the tax base on which new policies can be financed.
Our strategy for estimating the effect of health insurance on retirement has been to examine the effect of state and federal continuation coverage mandates on retirement propensities. We do this in a static regression framework, which allows us to exploit a very large data set and to avoid the problems of dynamic sample selection that plague other studies based on survey data. Our results suggest that continuation coverage mandates have a sizable and significant effect on retirement. Contrary to our basic intuition, however, the effects are not necessarily the strongest at older ages. Rather, taken in conjunction with evidence from dynamic models, we appear to find declining effects by age. We also found that one year of continuation benefits is associated with a 6% increase in insurance coverage levels, suggesting that these policies are not only inducing retirement, but are "inframarginally" covering those who would have retired anyway.
Our use of continuation coverage regulations as the source of variation for identifying the effect of insurance coverage on retirement has both advantages and disadvantages relative to looking directly at workers with and without employer-provided retiree health insurance. One potential problem with the latter strategy is that the researcher is unable to control for job characteristics that may be correlated with both the generosity of retiree health coverage and the incentives that these jobs offer for retirement. An obvious example is pensions (which are accounted for in both Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise 1994 and Gustman and Steinmeier 1994) . There may be a number of other ways in which firms encourage or discourage retirement, however, such as through the tasks that they assign older workers or the wage profile that these workers are offered. Furthermore, there may be sorting of workers by retirement propensities into the types of firms that do or do not offer retiree health insurance. To the extent that these are unobserved by the econometrician but correlated with both the offering of retiree coverage and the retirement decision, they will bias the estimated effect of such coverage on retirement. What is needed to identify the effect of retiree health insurance is exogenous assignment of such coverage to individuals that is independent of these other job characteristics. Continuation coverage mandates potentially provide such exogenous assignment.
The primary disadvantage of our strategy is that continuation benefits are more expensive to the early retiree than retirement health insurance and provide coverage only for a limited number of months. These differences may make it unreasonable to extrapolate our results to infer the effects of full retiree health insurance coverage. Future research should focus on combining a study of true employer-provided retiree coverage with an identification strategy that overcomes the omitted-variable bias problems described above. and Madrian (GM) infer that an additional 1.1% of the 55-64-year-old cohort choose retirement, which is 5.4% of its baseline value.'
The model implicit in figure 4.1 suggests that employees value the continued coverage by the certainty equivalent of the difference between the price for the extended insurance charge and a retiree's other health coverage options-either the selection-biased price of privately purchased insurance, or the highly variable costs of self-insurance. Since this difference grows as people get older and sicker, and health becomes more heterogeneous, the retirement inducement will grow with age. GM therefore predict that the older workers are, the more mandates for continuation of health coverage will increase retirement as a percentage of baseline. But they find the reverse.
GM might have made the opposite prediction if they had pushed the heterogeneity button a bit harder. Say potential retirees fall into two groups, Calibrators and Instinctuals. The Calibrators are the tribe traditionally studied by economists;2 they leave the Instinctuals to the sociologists. The Instinctuals range from bon vivants, the silver-haired types pictured on a golf course in national media advertising, to those too sick to work. One feature unites the Instinctuals-their decision to retire is unaffected by the cost of health insurance.
Evidence on the incidence of illness by age, including some presented by GM, show a rapid acceleration with age. For this reason alone, we would expect many more Instinctuals to have retired at 64, say, than at 55. Conceivably the acceleration with age of Calibrators' induced retirements could be more than proportional to the Instinctuals' upsweep. But maybe not. It depends in part on the elasticity of Calibrators' retirement with respect to health costs at each age.
The curve showing the number of workers who will be induced to retire by various levels of health savings may resemble many textbook labor-supply curves, with a range that is relatively flat followed by a range that is fairly inelastic. When coverage costs are reduced, the "cheap retirers" will go early. And the escalation in benefits over time, as people get sicker, may not be sufficient to get "expensive retirers" to participate. For example, it is often found that companies' early retirement plans disproportionately push out those at the 1. The impact is actually greater than that, since many employers were presumably already offering coverage before the government mandated it. As the mandate increases, it becomes a binding constraint on an ever-increasing percentage of firms. Assuming all months of coverage have the same effect, as GM do, this would produce a built-in nonlinearity.
2. The Calibrators have quite a challenge, since the implicit calculations are quite complex, probably sufficiently complex to defeat a pride of NBER researchers. GM find, for example, that one year of continuation coverage saves a worker $4,500 and has the same retirement consequences as $17,000 in Social Security wealth. They conclude, with reservations about variability among workers, that the two are worth the same. The logic doesn't follow, since the former is a price effect, whereas the latter is an income effect. Pity the poor worker confronted with this problem. Amos Tversky might explain the worker's behavior better than Alfred Marshall. bottom end of the qualifying age range. And so it may be with some retirement due to reduced health care costs.
Retirement is a complex decision, involving health, location, and friends, as well as dollar costs and benefits, and we should be cautious before predicting the age-specific effects of inducements. We should be more cautious still when making predictions relative to baselines, given the array of reasons why workers retire.
GM are moving on to dynamic assessments of the transition to retirement in forthcoming work. They have already shown they can do the econometric nipups required to deal with sample selection issues. A bit of dextrous modeling as an accompaniment would now help them distill more about who retires and why.
GM complement an informative compilation of background data-agespecific patterns of health, expenditures, and coverage-with sound empirical methods to reach intuitive results. Embracing these results, what shall we make of mandates that require employers to sell health insurance to their retirees at a subsidized price? The economist's first concern-excess consumption-is hardly a problem: rational retirees would buy the insurance even at fair actuarial prices.
What of distributional consequences? Until wage adjustments work through the system-which could take quite a while, given that the system shock is a government mandate-these impositions represent a transfer from continuing workers to retirees. In the long run, wages will be pushed down to pay for this new mandated benefit, which thus becomes an imposed subsidy of one group by another.
What are the welfare consequences of this imposed subsidy? Should rational employers dealing with rational workers offer such coverage voluntarily? At least to deal with the adverse selection problem, it might seem so. Subsidized insurance is a second-best remedy to the hidden information problem. Add to this the labor economist's belief that age-earnings profiles are steeper than productivity profiles, which implies that older workers don't earn their keep. A subsidy for retirement may promote efficiency in the composition of a company's labor force, quite apart from saving the company money.
The company should also be concerned about who decides to retire in return for this small health coverage benefit. (The federally mandated eighteen months saves the retiree roughly $7,000, but costs the company far less, since it also subsidizes health coverage for older workers who do not retire.) If the most talented workers, who are presumably underpaid given bureaucratic constraints at firms, dash to retire (perhaps due to confidence that they can get another job), this will be poor policy. But if the sickly take off, reassured by coverage for a period in retirement, it looks more promising. In any deliberation by the firm, it should recognize, as GM find, that an extension of coverage induces about 5.5 times as many people to buy insurance as it does to retire.
In the short run, this multiplies the cost enormously. In the long run, downward wage adjustments wash out this effect. In sum, particularly in an era when many established firms are downsizing, continued health coverage in retirement may be an inexpensive way around a range of labor market rigidities.
What of the government's interest in promoting health coverage continuation? Some would argue that the government needs to step in due to market imperfections in the insurance market for older workers. But firms already have an incentive to address this problem on their own. The intensity of government action in this area is probably due to a desire to provide a subsidy to a specified group of workers-those about to retire-leaving till later the worry about who will ultimately pay.
The government's major concern should be whether we want workers to retire. If you think the size of the labor force is relatively fixed, a popular but noneconomic viewpoint, then you might promote retirement to spread things around. An economist would urge the government to consider the relationship of expected Social Security less taxes to retirement age. Since the relationship is strongly negative, the government should be in the business of delaying, not promoting, retirement.
These are revolutionary times in health insurance. Market conditions are forcing firms to drastic action. The federal government may soon make dramatic moves. GM demonstrate that even comparatively modest changes in government health coverage regulations have significant effects on retirement behavior. Their paper offers a more general lesson: health insurance interventions by the government have significant effects on the operation of labor markets.
